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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks
Prevent Agents from Using their Private
Information Eﬃciently? ∗
Abstract
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent
communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its
overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons
for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables
agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge.
This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for
which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to
neglect their private knowledge.
Keywords: transparency; private information; common knowledge.
JEL-Codes: D83, E58
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag analysiert im Rahmen eines einfachen Global Games Ansatzes die
Wohlfahrtseﬀekte verschiedener Kommunikationsstrategien von Zentralbanken: Die
Bank kann entweder nur ihre Einsch¨ atzung des Gesamtzustandes einer ¨ Okonomie
geben, oder sie kann tranparenter sein, indem sie detailliert Gr¨ unde f¨ ur ihre Ein 
sch¨ atzung ver¨ oﬀentlicht. Es wird gezeigt, dass letztere Strategie ¨ uberlegen ist,
weil sie es erst den Wirtschaftssubjekten erm¨ oglicht, ihre private Information voll
zu nutzen. Das Ergebnis bleibt auch dann bestehen, wenn die Strategien der
Wirtschaftssubjekte komplement¨ ar zueinander sind, obwohl f¨ ur diesen Fall h¨ auﬁg
argumentiert wird, dass zu viel Zentralbanktransparenz zu einer Vernachl¨ assigung
privater Information f¨ uhren k¨ onnte.
Schlagw¨ orter: Transparenz; Private Information; Common Knowledge.
JEL-Codes: D83, E58
∗ I would like to thank Alexander Ludwig and participants of the session ”‘monetary policy
transparency and heterogeneity”’ of the 2007 meeting of the European Economic Association
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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks
Prevent Agents from Using their Private
Information Eﬃciently?
1 Introduction
”Striking the balance between the need for clear and simple messages and the need
to adequately convey complexity is a constant challenge for central bank commu 
nication.” This statement of a central banker, the long standing chief economist of
the European Central Bank Otmar Issing (2005), has recently been put into the lan 
guage of economic theory: Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2007) argue that
”there may be welfare losses resulting from the fact that the opportunity to utilize
the greater sophistication is foregone in favor of simplicity. However, simplicity is a
great virtue in its ability to generate common understanding. There is a trade oﬀ
here.” 1 Morris and Shin show this trade oﬀ under the assumption that the central
bank can either publish a set of highly precise pieces of information, that are however
‘fragmented’ in the sense that each piece is only understood by a speciﬁc subgroup
of the general public, or publish a single piece of information that is less precise, but
becomes common knowledge to the whole public. In this setting, it might be better
to be less precise and less fragmented if coordination between agents is an important
objective. If, however, it is more important that agents are well informed about the
state of the economy, then it might be better to publish the more precise and more
fragmented information. In a closely related paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show
that if the central bank can only publish information as common knowledge, and
coordination of agents is irrelevant for common welfare, then it might be better not
1 They see this trade-oﬀ not only in the communication strategy of central banks, but also in
the regulation of accounting systems for ﬁrms.
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to publish information that helps agents coordinating but might have the eﬀect that
private information about the state of the economy is neglected.
This paper argues that the trade oﬀ between publishing information as common
knowledge and the use of more precise, but ”fragmented” information by private
agents can be considered as an artefact of the simplicity of the information structure
used by Morris and Shin (2002, 2007). Instead, we will stress the point that good
public information is an important precondition for an eﬃcient use of private or
”fragmented” information. This is shown in a simple global games framework that
is in many aspects close to that of Morris and Shin (2007). In particular, we assume
that the central bank has reasons for its assessment of the state of the economy, and
it has the option either to communicate these reasons to the public or just to publish
the overall assessment. The former strategy of communication is called transparent,
the latter intransparent. The transparent strategy does not yield better common
knowledge about the state of the economy than in the case of the intransparent
strategy. However, the detailed account on the information which has led to the
assessment makes the agents’ private information on the economy more precise.
This is so because each agent is expert for a speciﬁc sector of the economy, and a
detailed account from the central bank gives her valuable information about those
sectors she is not expert of. It will be shown that in such a setting, a transparent
communication strategy is always welfare enhancing, even if positive or negative
externalities of coordination between the actions of economic agents exist.
In the following this argument will be stated formally: section 2 sets the framework.
Section 3 analyses the welfare eﬀects of a transparent communication strategy as
opposed to an intransparent one. Section 4 sums up and gives an outlook on possible
future research.
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2 A formal framework
The basic model of the central bank’s communication strategies centres around a
parameter Θ that represents the fundamental state of the economy.
We might think of Θ as standing for the activity level of the economy. There is
a continuum of agents of unit mass indexed by the unit interval [0; 1]. For them,
information about Θ is important, because it is beneﬁcial for them to align their
actions, e.g. their investment into shares, to the overall activity level. In addition,
the single representative agent k beneﬁts from aligning her action to those of the
other agents (or from ”coordination” of actions). Thus, the incentives for actions
are partly those of the famous ”beauty contest” that served Keynes (1936, chapter
12) as a metaphor for modern stock market activities. For example, if the prices
of shares go up because the demand from other agents is high, it is beneﬁcial to
participate in the stock investment boom.
For a start, we assume that the agents weigh the two aspects according to the same
loss function according to Radner (1961):









(with 0 ≤ r ≤ 1). Thus, the interests of all agents are identical; this case of common
interest can be used as a simple benchmark in analysing the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent
information structures (see Morris and Shin 2007).
Parameter Θ is a catch all variable for the fundamental state of the economy; it







Every agent is expert in one sector i (a type i expert). This means that she knows the
realisation of the activity level of one sector i, θi. Experts are equally distributed
over the sectors: 1/nth of all agents are experts for a sector i. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that prior to the information from the central bank, any
activity level of a sector agents are not experts of is equally likely for them: for an
agent of type i, the parameter θj￿=i has an improper uniform distribution over the
real line.
The central bank observes noisy signals xi = θi + ηi over the activity levels of the
single sectors, with ηi as independent and identically distributed random variables
with mean zero and variance 1/γ (precision γ). The central bank can choose between
two communication strategies: the ﬁrst is called intransparent. Here, the bank
publishes only the overall assessment X =
￿n
i=1 xi and in this way makes it common
knowledge among all agents. The second strategy is publishing the detailed reasons
for the overall assessment, i.e. making all xi and with them X common knowledge.
This strategy is called transparent.
Next we look at the equilibrium strategies of agents under the two diﬀerent regimes
of central bank communication.
2.1 Equilibrium strategies of agents
Agent k minimizes her loss according to (1) by choosing the following action ak:
ak = (1 − r)Ek(Θ) + rEk(a) (3)
with a as the average action
￿
amdm of agents. The expected activity level of the
economy Ek(Θ) and the average action of other agents Ek(a) expected by agent k
depend on the information published by the central bank.
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2.1.1 The case of transparent communication
Agents know that there are n diﬀerent types of agents that each have a particular
information set. The equilibrium can be found by the ”Guess and solve” method.
First we take the hypothesis that in equilibrium, the action of a type i agent is




xj, and of the overall activity level expected by the central bank X:








Using this assumption for determining Ek(a) gives the following representation of













r(n − 1 + λ)
n
X (5)
Thus, if other agents behave according to (4), it is optimal for an agent of type i to





Clearly, the more important acting in close alignment with other agents is, the more
closely to her estimation of a the agent acts (∂λ/∂r > 0). Moreover, if there are only
a few sectors in the economy, the private information of an agent will help her to
estimate the true activity level very well and this information will strongly inﬂuence
her action (∂λ/∂n > 0).
With equilibrium strategies derived, the expected loss under transparency, Lt, of an
agent can be calculated. It is dependent on Ei(ai−Θ)2 = n(n−1)/(γn)+λ2/γ and
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Ei(ai − aj￿=i)2 = 2(1 − λ)2/γ (see appendix) and is given by:









n(r + n − nr − 1)
γ(n − r)
(7)
Clearly, the loss decreases with increasing precision of the public information
(∂Lt/∂γ < 0); it is increasing in the number of sectors (∂Lt/∂n > 0) because a
small n means that every agent has a precise knowledge about a larger part of the
overall economy. In the special case that agents are only interested in coordination
of actions (r = 1), there is no loss because they simply coordinate on the public
signal X =
￿
xi, independently of their private information on speciﬁc sectors.
2.1.2 The case of intransparent communication
In the case of intransparent communication, the central bank publishes only its
overall assessment of the economy X. Because it is assumed that prior to the
information from the central bank, any value of the fundamental of a sector agents
are not experts of is equally likely for them, the private information about the
sector they know has no value for estimating the overall activity level. Thus, the
best strategy for all agents is to adapt their action to the overall assessment of the





Because all agents choose the same action, the loss depends only on the precision of
the overall assessment of the central bank n/γ, and on how important the objective
of coordination is.
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3 Welfare eﬀects of transparency
3.1 The case without externalities
As mentioned at the beginning of section 2, for the loss function (1), losses of all
agents are identical and are a measure of the overall welfare loss. The diﬀerence
between the welfare loss under an intransparent communication policy and a trans 
parent one is:




We ﬁnd that Lnt − Lt > 0 for r < 1. Thus, in general, the transparent policy is
better than the intransparent one. The positive eﬀect of transparency is the smaller






n(2n − r − 1)(r − 1)
(n − r)2 < 0 (10)
Even in the extreme case of r = 1, however, intransparent communication is not
strictly preferable (Lnt − Lt = 0): if agents care only about coordination, they pay
attention only to the overall assessment of the central bank X as a coordination
device. The result that publishing information useful only to speciﬁc parts of the
public cannot do harm whatever the importance of coordination is contrary to the
results in Morris and Shin (2007); those were derived under the assumption that
publishing both speciﬁc information and an overall assessment is not an option.
3.2 The case with negative externalities
2 Note that n ≥ 2.For n = 1 there is perfect information of all agents without any need for
communication.
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Up to now, we worked with preference structures that implied no externalities be 
tween actions of diﬀerent agents. This simpliﬁcation will be removed now, because,
as Morris and Shin (2002) have argued, too much transparency might be detrimental
to welfare if the objective of coordination is very important for the single agents,
but not for overall welfare. Such a case can be modelled by measuring the reward
of being close to the average action of other agents relatively to the average dis 
persion of actions. Thus, in order to check whether the result of Morris and Shin
(2002) is possible in our setting, we deﬁne the individual loss function with negative
externalities Lne
k for agent k as:
L
ne




















leads to a zero sum game of agents with respect to coor 
dination, it cancels out for welfare Lne:
L




The welfare analysis is (except for the constant (1−r)) identical to the case without
externalities and r = 0. Clearly, a transparent policy is welfare enhancing. This
result is in contrast to the main point of Morris/Shin (2002), because in our setting
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it is just the transparent policy itself that enables agents to exploit their private
information.
3.3 The case with positive externalities
What if choosing complementary strategies generates positive instead of negative
externalities? Quite opposite to what was discussed above, it might be argued
that in this case a transparent communication strategy could be detrimental in our
setting, because it enables agents to exploit their private knowledge and come closer
to the real state Θ instead of coming closer to each other. Positive externalities
arise if agents beneﬁt from being close to one another independently of the average
dispersion.3 The individual loss function with positive externalities L
pe









The optimal action is again given by (3). The social loss function Lpe is simply the
average of the individual losses:
L







If an agent k maximized this social loss function, she would take the positive exter 








3 In coming closer to somebody else an agent is better oﬀ, but the other agent beneﬁts too; this
is an externality.
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Note that the expected average strategy Ek (a) would have more weight in deter 
mining ak than in the case without positive externalities.













t > 0 for r < 1. Thus, in general, welfare is still higher with
a transparent policy than with an intransparent one. The advantage is, however,
smaller than in the case without positive externalities from coordination.4












This paper has shown for a speciﬁc informational structure that the communication
strategy of a central bank does not face a the trade oﬀ between enhancing the
common knowledge about the state of the economy and the use of more precise, but
”fragmented” information by private agents. Instead, a transparent communication
strategy is an important precondition for an eﬃcient use of private or ”fragmented”
information. This means in our framework that the central bank should publish
reasons for its assessment that are detailed enough to meet the diﬀering needs of
diﬀerently informed agents. This point was also stressed by Issing (2005) in his
statement about the challenges a central banker faces in communicating with the
public; he added to the words cited at the beginning of this paper: ”An additional
diﬃculty stems from the need to address various target groups, including academics,
the markets, politicians, and the general public. Such a broad spectrum may require
a variety of communication channels geared to diﬀerent levels of complexity.” The
framework presented here might be interpreted as the model of a communication that
is able to completely solve the tasks described by Issing. But trade oﬀs might again
be found in a more complex informational setting. One step in this direction would,
for example, be introducing some prior information of a representative agent of type
i about the state of the sectors θi￿=k she is not expert of. The basic argument of
this paper, however, should still hold in a more complex setting: a more transparent
information policy makes private information of traders more valuable.5
5 This is also the central point of Lindner (2006) that deals with conditions for multiplicity of
equilibria in a global games context.
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A Derivation of equation 5
Using the guessed equation








for determination of the average strategy a yields the following representation of the
agent’s action:





















Rearranging terms yields equation (5).
B Derivation of the loss function 7






























































Summing these two weighted terms and simplifying gives equation (7).
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 16/2007 17IWH
References
Issing, O., Communication, Transparency, Accountability: Monetary Policy in the
Twenty First Century, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 87, 65 83.
Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,
London: Macmillan.
Lindner, A. (2006), Can Transparency of Central Banks produce Multiple Equilibria
on Currency Markets?, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108, 1 14.
Morris, S., Shin, H. (2002), Social Value of Public Information, The American Eco-
nomic Review 92, 1521 1534.
Morris, S., Shin, H. (forthcoming), Optimal Communication, Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings 5 (2007).
Radner, R. (1961), Team Decision Problems, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33,
857 881.
18 IWH-Diskussionspapiere 16/2007